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Legal Notes
Harold Dudley Greeley, Editor.
RESPONSIBILITY IN LIMITED AUDITS

The recent decision of the supreme court of Alberta in Jamieson, Austin &
Mitchell, Ltd. v. Battrum (1934), 1 Western Weekly Reports 324 affirms again
the proposition of law that auditors are not liable for alleged negligence when
the client by contract with them had so strictly limited the scope of their audit
that it was practically impossible for them to uncover irregularities. The
leading case of International Laboratories, Inc. v. Dewar, et al. (1933), 2 Western
Weekly Reports 529, to this effect was discussed in The Journal of Account
ancy for January, 1934.
In the Jamieson case the plaintiff was a small private company with only a
few shareholders, most of whom were actually engaged in the management of
its business as an insurance broker. The defendant was a professional auditor.
The plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging that he was negligent in the per
formance of his duties as auditor and that the plaintiff thereby suffered damages.
It appeared that the chief reason for defendant’s employment was that de
fendant, who was not a licensed insurance agent, might through the medium of
fees charged as auditor share to some extent in commissions received by plain
tiff on insurance business produced by defendant. The defendant was not
appointed by the shareholders or by the registrar, pursuant to the provisions
of the companies act, but he was employed by the president on behalf of the
company. The books of account were simple and if all entries had been prop
erly made and all cash receipts properly deposited the financial condition of the
company would have been disclosed by the cashbook and the general ledger.
The president told the defendant that no auditing was needed but that defend
ant was to do some checking on the books. The defendant assisted the secre
tary-treasurer in balancing his books and during some of the years he prepared
annual statements and signed them as auditor for the purpose of income-tax
returns. He did a certain amount of detail checking, including the posting
of totals to the general ledger, but during one of the years in question he did
no checking in the clients’ ledger which was a loose-leaf book. He checked
cashbook entries with bank records but did not make an audit to ascertain
whether or not all cash received had been entered in the cashbook. The direc
tors knew that no audit was being made and they knew that their method of
handling cash receipts, some of which were never entered in the cashbook or
deposited in the bank, made defendant’s work in checking of very little value.
Defendant had no reason to suspect the slightest dishonesty on the part of any
of plaintiff’s officers.
In the action brought against defendant the main item of complaint was
that a financial statement prepared by him overstated an account receivable
by approximately $3,700. The court held that defendant was not responsible
for this, because his statement correctly showed the financial condition dis
closed by the general ledger and he had not been permitted to make any audit.
Another claim was for an alleged shortage of $600 which defendant had not
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uncovered. The court held that this loss, if it was incurred, was caused directly
by the negligent methods of plaintiff’s officers and not by any act or omission
of the defendant. The court held that it was not the defendant’s duty to
complain to the officers of the company, who were its main shareholders, con
cerning their methods of dealing with cash receipts. The plaintiff sought to
charge him also with a failure to write off a sufficient amount of bad accounts
receivable. The court cleared him of the charge of negligence in this respect,
stating that “in this particular case at least, it would be preposterous for an
auditor who knew nothing about the debtors to set up his judgment with re
spect to any particular accounts against the judgment of the officers of the
company who knew the debtors personally and who must have had a more or
less intimate knowledge of their general standing.” The plaintiff was not
allowed to recover fees paid to the defendant nor was it allowed to charge him
with the cost of an investigation by other auditors after his discharge. The
plaintiff’s action was dismissed in its entirety.
auditor’s DUTY UNDER ENGLISH COMPANIES ACT TO REPORT TO MEMBERS

An interesting and novel point was settled by the decision of the English
high court (chancery division) on March 15, 1934, in the matter of Allen, Craig
& Co. (London), Ltd. Section 134 of that statute directed that every auditor
should make a report to the members of the company on the accounts examined
by them. The court construed that section to mean that the report should be
made to the members in a general meeting but, if none was called, the auditor’s
duty was fulfilled by sending his report to the secretary of the company. The
official report of this decision is not yet available but it was summarized in
The Law Times for March 31, 1934 (vol. 177, page 223), and in the law reports
supplement to The Accountant for April 28, 1934.
Allen, Craig & Co., an importer of chemicals and oils, was registered in 1921
with a capital of £10,000. Its financial reports up to and including December
31, 1930, showed losses for every year, at an average of approximately £3,500.
These reports were signed by two directors and by the auditors. The liquida
tor of the company sought to charge the auditors with misfeasance and to hold
them, together with the managing director, for debts of the company contracted
after a date in 1925. He did not allege any deliberate misconduct by the audi
tors or any lack of professional skill on their part, but based his claim on the
fact that the auditors rendered their report to the company secretary who did
not call a meeting of the members. The liquidator argued that when no
general meeting was called the auditors should send a copy of their report to
every member of the company. The court held that this was not required by
the statute. The auditors had no power to call a meeting of members or to
compel any company officer to call one, and the meaning of the statute could
not be alternative and depend on whether or not a general meeting was called.
To require the auditors to send a copy of their report to every member would
impose an undue burden on the auditors. The statute was construed to mean
that the report should be presented to the members at a general meeting if one
was called; if none was called, the report should be sent to the secretary who
could be compelled by the members to disclose it.
The managing director, who was characterized as an incurable optimist, was
held liable for the debts, but the charges against the auditors were dismissed.

449

The Journal of Accountancy
The auditors had written several long letters to the company analyzing its
financial condition and drawing attention to the necessity of having a general
meeting of shareholders unless further capital was procured, but the managing
director had done nothing except to discuss these letters with the auditors who
wrote them.
AUDITOR AS EXPERT WITNESS

In the Canadian litigation between the trustee in bankruptcy of the Blue
Band Navigation Company and Price Waterhouse & Co., one of the incidental
points is of interest to accountants in the United States who from time to time
serve as trustees in bankruptcy or in other similar capacities. The court held
that a trustee in bankruptcy can not be compelled to give evidence as an expert
simply because he happens to be a member of a certain calling of which one
of the parties to the litigation is a member. Trustee of the property of Blue
Band Navigation Company, Ltd., a bankrupt, v. Price Waterhouse & Co.,
47 British Columbia Reports 258.
The Blue Band company had been engaged in the towing business from its
incorporation in 1920 to its bankruptcy in 1931. The defendants had been its
auditors since the date of incorporation. The trustee in bankruptcy sued the
auditors for alleged negligence, misfeasance and breach of contract. During
an examination of the trustee, who was an auditor by profession, he was asked
this question: “When you conduct an audit yourself, Mr. Carmichael, do you
find it necessary to rely to some extent upon the statements made to you by
officers of the company on information supplied to you by them? ” He refused
to answer the question and both the lower court and the court on appeal
sustained him in his refusal. One of the judges stated that it would be unfair
to the bankrupt company to hold it bound by any opinion which the trustee
might express as a member of any calling or profession to which he might
belong. He should be examined only as to matters directly concerning the
company he represents. One of the other judges indicated that it might be
proper to examine the trustee as an expert because he, as an auditor, had
advised himself, as trustee, that a cause of action existed against the defendants
and he should be subject to cross-examination as to the facts and practices upon
which he based his opinion.
On the point of the auditor’s right to rely on information and statements
made by officers of the company, the chief justice wrote that clearly he could
not rely upon statements to the effect that there was nothing wrong with the
books, but that he was entitled to get such information as would enable him
to examine the books with intelligence.
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